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INTRODUCTION 
Banking regulation is first and foremost preoccupied with the 
problem of excessive risk-taking by banks and other leveraged financial 
intermediaries,1 which can lead to bank runs and panics and their resulting 
                                                     
* Assistant Professor of Law, UC Irvine School of Law. 
 1. The term “bank” is one that is used inconsistently. See David Min, Understanding the Failures 
of Market Discipline, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 1421, 1424 n.7 (2015) [hereinafter Market Discipline] 
(explaining the different ways in which the term “bank” is defined). In the United States, the term 
“bank” (sometimes also called a “commercial bank” or “traditional bank” to distinguish it from 
investment banking) has often been used to describe depository institutions, which rely on short-term 
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high economic costs.2 In recent times, regulators have sought to curb bank 
risk-taking almost exclusively through external “safety and soundness” 
regulations,3 which emphasize, among other things, capital requirements, 
disclosure, and an intensive examination process.4 Modern banking 
regulation, both in the United States and abroad, has largely ignored the 
internal governance of banks.5 Surprisingly, this is true even in the 
aftermath of the financial crisis, which seemed to illustrate the 
shortcomings of external regulatory restrictions. To the extent that 
policymakers consider bank governance issues, they typically defer to the 
corporate governance literature, which focuses on shareholder agency 
costs and generally promotes solutions that best align manager and 
shareholder interests, as I describe infra in Part I.A. 
The Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 provides a good example of the short 
shrift that policymakers have paid to internal bank governance.6  
Dodd-Frank makes a number of important changes to bank safety and 
soundness regulation, particularly for so-called “systemically important 
financial institutions” (SIFIs).7 Under the changes implemented by  
Dodd-Frank, SIFIs now face new consolidated capital and examination 
requirements and a newly created resolution regime called the “Orderly 
Liquidation Authority,” intended to end the prospect of government 
bailouts of uninsured investors.8 Dodd-Frank also implements new 
mortgage origination and securitization standards that banks must follow 
and creates a Consumer Financial Protection Bureau to promulgate and 
enforce consumer protection rules relating to bank loans and other 
                                                     
(often demand) deposits to fund their investments in loans and other credit instruments. Id. With the 
rise of “shadow banking,” which serves the same credit intermediation functions as traditional 
banking, the definitional lines around the term “bank” have become more blurred. Id. at 1449–52. In 
this Article, outside of Part I.A. and unless stated otherwise, the terms “bank” and “banking” are used 
to describe all leveraged financial intermediaries that rely heavily on short-term funding to finance 
their investments in credit instruments and thus are vulnerable to the problem of bank runs. 
 2. The recent financial crisis was estimated to have cost the United States as much as $14 trillion. 
See Tyler Atkinson et al., How Bad Was It? The Costs and Consequences of the 2007-09 Financial 
Crisis, STAFF PAPERS (Fed Reserve Bank Dallas), July 2013, at 1–2. As Reinhart and Rogoff, among 
others, have observed, similarly large costs have always resulted from financial crises. See generally 
CARMEN M. REINHART & KENNETH S. ROGOFF, THIS TIME IS DIFFERENT: EIGHT CENTURIES OF 
FINANCIAL FOLLY (2009). 
 3. Safety and soundness regulation is often referred to as “prudential regulation,” and the two 
terms are frequently used interchangeably. See, e.g., Frederic S. Mishkin, Prudential Supervision: Why 
Is It Important and What Are the Issues?, in PRUDENTIAL SUPERVISION: WHAT WORKS AND WHAT 
DOESN’T 1, 1 (Frederic S. Mishkin ed., 2001). 
 4. Id. at 8. 
 5. See infra Part I.A–I.B. 
 6. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
124 Stat. 1376 (2010) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank] (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). 
 7. Id. § 115. 
 8. Id. §§ 202–210. 
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financial products.9 Notably, almost all of these changes are external 
regulatory measures that outside regulators must monitor and enforce. 
Dodd-Frank contemplates only a handful of minor changes to the 
internal corporate governance of banks, including provisions calling for: 
increased disclosures related to executive compensation (including any 
“golden parachutes”);10 a non-binding shareholder vote on executive 
compensation;11 increased proxy access;12 and “clawback” mandates 
requiring corporations to develop and enforce policies that would take 
back incentive-based compensation from executives in the event of an 
accounting restatement.13 These measures all attempt to address 
managerial wrongdoing and more closely align the incentives of corporate 
executives and shareholders. In this regard, the reforms proposed by 
Dodd-Frank are consistent with the corporate governance literature, which 
generally focuses on shareholder–manager agency conflicts and plays up 
the importance of shareholder interests.14 But as I discuss in Part I of this 
Article, banks are different from nonfinancial corporations in that there are 
strong reasons to believe that the prioritization of bank shareholder 
interests encourages greater risk-taking and thus works contrary to the 
purposes of banking regulators. 
Part I briefly describes the traditional agency–cost approach to 
corporate governance and the rationale that is offered for elevating the 
agency–cost concerns of shareholders over those of other stakeholders 
(especially creditors). But as Part I goes on to argue, even if this 
justification for shareholder primacy is convincing in corporate 
governance generally (and there are many who do not find it so), several 
unique characteristics of banks obviate the reasoning behind  
shareholder primacy. Banks are highly leveraged, which exacerbates  
creditor–shareholder agency conflicts and places greater importance on 
the interests of creditors. Banks enjoy government guarantees, and thus 
their corporate governance (and allocation of gains and losses) is not 
merely a matter of private ordering, but one that implicates the public 
interest. And bank failures create massive negative social and economic 
costs not borne by bank investors, providing another key basis for rejecting 
shareholder primacy in bank governance. 
                                                     
 9. Id. §§ 1011–1029. 
 10. Id. §§ 951, 953. 
 11. Id. § 951. 
 12. Id. § 957. The SEC’s rule implementing Dodd-Frank’s Section 957 was famously vacated 
by the D.C. Circuit in its controversial decision, Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1156 (D.C. 
Cir. 2011). The D.C. Circuit found that the SEC had failed to adequately consider the economic 
consequences of its rule. Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1148. 
 13. Dodd-Frank, supra note 6, § 954. 
 14. See infra Part I.B. 
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Part II provides an overview of the potential solutions for  
bank governance and argues that a realignment of bank governance  
priorities—specifically, deemphasizing shareholder primacy and 
expressly recognizing creditor interests—is likely to be most promising. 
Part II also briefly reviews the possibility of using existing  
laws—specifically, longstanding “commitment statutes” and the relatively 
recent phenomenon of statutes authorizing “benefit corporations”—as a 
means to help reorder bank governance. 
I. THE CONFLICT BETWEEN SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY 
AND BANK SAFETY AND SOUNDNESS 
While the financial crisis spurred some fairly significant regulatory 
changes, it has not yet led to significant changes in bank governance. 
Dodd-Frank contains only several small changes to bank governance,15 
and Basel III16 does not look to change bank governance at all.17 While 
some academics have begun to examine bank governance in the aftermath 
of the crisis,18 regulators and policymakers have largely focused their 
efforts on creating and implementing new or revised external restrictions 
on risk-taking.19 To the very limited extent that we have seen legal or 
regulatory changes to bank governance, they have tended to defer to the 
conventional wisdom espoused in the corporate governance literature, 
which seeks to more closely align the interests of bank managers with 
shareholders, as I describe above.20 
But, as this Part describes, the shareholder primacy norm that 
dominates corporate law today is not necessarily well-suited for bank 
                                                     
 15. See supra notes 10–13 and accompanying text. 
 16. The Basel Committee on Bank Supervision includes the central banks of all of the OECD 
countries and is the primary global standard setter for the prudential regulation of banks. See About 
the Basel Committee, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, http://www.bis.org/bcbs/about.htm 
[https://perma.cc/T89Y-C8KX]. The Basel Committee issues recommended prudential regulation 
guidelines that are intended to be adopted by the Committee’s members. See History of the Basel 
Committee, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, http://www.bis.org/bcbs/history.htm [https://perma.cc/ 
2L6U-BBZ7]. “Basel III” refers to a series of recommended reforms to bank prudential regulation 
issued between 2011 and 2014, meant to update the previous two sets of recommendations offered by 
the Basel Committee, commonly known as Basel I and Basel II. Id. 
 17. See generally BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BASEL III: A GLOBAL 
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR MORE RESILIENT BANKS AND BANKING SYSTEMS (2011). 
 18. See, e.g., CLAIRE A. HILL & RICHARD W. PAINTER, BETTER BANKERS, BETTER BANKS: 
PROMOTING GOOD BUSINESS THROUGH CONTRACTUAL COMMITMENT (2015); John Armour & 
Jeffrey N. Gordon, Systemic Harms and Shareholder Value, 6 J. LEGAL ANAL. 35 (2014); Lucian A. 
Bebchuk & Holger Spamann, Regulating Bankers’ Pay, 98 GEO. L.J. 247 (2010); Steven L. Schwarcz, 
Misalignment: Corporate Risk-Taking and Public Duty, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1 (2016). 
 19. For example, as described supra in notes 4–8 and accompanying text, Dodd-Frank focused 
almost entirely on extrinsic regulations. 
 20. See supra notes 10–13 and accompanying text. 
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governance.21 Corporate governance elevates the interests of shareholders 
over other corporate stakeholders, based in large part on the normative 
claim that shareholder primacy is a more efficient state of corporate 
governance than the alternatives.22 But even if we accept the validity of 
this argument, described below in Section A of this Part, there are several 
features unique to banks that present a strong case against shareholder 
primacy in bank governance. Banks are highly leveraged, which heightens 
the creditor–shareholder agency conflicts in bank governance and suggests 
that more weight should be given to bank creditor interests. The 
government insures (either explicitly or implicitly) the vast majority of 
bank creditors, which transforms these creditor–shareholder conflicts into 
public policy–shareholder conflicts. Additionally, bank failures create 
enormous negative externalities, which provide another compelling 
rationale for deemphasizing shareholder interests in bank governance. 
A. Bank Governance 
The United States has an unusual banking system in several regards. 
First, both the federal government and state governments issue bank 
charters.23 This “dual banking” system is unique to the United States and 
is rooted in the struggle over states’ rights that goes back to the nineteenth 
century.24 Second, bank charters are distinct from the organizational 
charters for non-bank businesses, such as corporations and partnerships.25 
Banks do not need corporate charters, and corporations may not engage in 
the “business of banking.”26 Third, because of this legal distinction 
between bank and corporate charters, bank governance in the United States 
is, at least as a legal matter, distinct from corporate governance. Bank 
                                                     
 21. Of course, there are a number of well-respected critiques of shareholder primacy, including 
Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout’s famous “team production theory” of the corporation, which argues 
that U.S. corporate law is best understood as an attempt to address the team production problems 
endemic to the corporate form. Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of 
Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 248–54 (1999). Team production problems arise when a number 
of different groups must commit to making coordinated—and thus firm-specific—investments in the 
firm. Id. at 249. Under this account, corporate law solves the problem of how to divide up any rents 
created by team production by forcing all team production members under the authority of the 
corporate board of directors. Id. at 251–54. The board acts as a “mediating hierarchy” that fairly 
apportions economic surpluses generated by the firm among the different team members. Id. at  
253–55. Under this account, any prioritization of shareholder interests unfairly and inefficiently 
empowers rent-seeking by shareholders. Id. at 256–57. 
 22. See David Min, Corporate Political Activity and Non-Shareholder Agency Costs, 33 YALE 
J. REG. 101, 131–32 (2016). 
 23. See Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, Myth of Competition in the Dual Banking System, 
73 CORNELL L. REV. 677, 681–83 (1988). 
 24. See id. 
 25. See Robert C. Hockett & Saule T. Omarova, “Special,” Vestigial, or Visionary? What Bank 
Regulation Tells Us About the Corporation—and Vice Versa, 39 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 453, 474 (2016). 
 26. Id. 
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director fiduciary duties have developed separately in common law from 
corporate director duties.27 Furthermore, bank regulators possess broad 
statutory enforcement powers to remove bank directors for unsafe or 
unsound banking practices, which effectively creates another duty of 
safety and soundness for bank directors.28 
However, while these differences between bank governance and 
corporate governance are real, they are not particularly significant for 
several reasons. First, the common law development of bank governance 
largely disappeared for several decades following the enactment of the 
New Deal-era banking reforms, as there were virtually no bank failures 
between World War II and the 1970s.29 Thus, even as the courts were 
dramatically shaping corporate law over this period, and as scholars were 
developing new theoretical and normative foundations of corporate law, 
there was a marked lack of development of bank governance law over the 
same period.30 Because bank governance did not develop as a separate 
body of law during this time, the laws applicable to bank governance are 
quite similar to those for corporate governance. Bank shareholders enjoy 
the same limited liability as corporate shareholders,31 bank directors have 
similar fiduciary duties to corporate directors,32 and, just as in corporate 
law, these fiduciary duties are primarily owed to shareholders.33 
                                                     
 27. See Patricia A. McCoy, A Political Economy of the Business Judgment Rule in Banking: 
Implications for Corporate Law, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1 (1996); Jonathan R. Macey & Maureen 
O’Hara, The Corporate Governance of Banks, 9 FED. RES. BANK N.Y. ECON. POL’Y REV. 91, 99 
(2003). 
 28. See Heidi Mandanis Schooner, Fiduciary Duties’ Demanding Cousin: Bank Director 
Liability for Unsafe or Unsound Banking Practices, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 175, 188 (1995) (citing 
Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, § 30, 48 Stat. 162, 193–94); Lawrence G. Baxter, Fiduciary Issues in 
Federal Banking Regulation, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 7, 13 (1993). 
 29. See Min, Market Discipline, supra note 1, at 1431–32. 
 30. McCoy, A Political Economy of the Business Judgment Rule in Banking, supra note 27, at 2, 
22–25. See also Richard B. Dyson, The Director’s Liability for Negligence, 40 IND. L.J. 341, 343–44 
(1965) (stating that claims against bank directors for governance failures almost entirely predated 
World War II). 
 31. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Double Liability of Bank Shareholders: History 
and Implications, 27 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 31, 38–39 (1992) (describing how bank shareholder 
liability has been equivalent to corporate shareholder liability since the 1940s). 
 32. See Ronald W. Stevens & Bruce H. Nielson, The Standard of Care for Directors and Officers 
of Federally Chartered Depository Institutions: It’s Gross Negligence Regardless of Whether Section 
1821(k) Preempts Federal Common Law, 13 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 169, 193–221 (1994) (noting 
that state laws governing bank director duties almost universally set forth a gross negligence standard 
that is analogous to that owed by corporate directors, either by common law or statute, and often in 
conjunction with the shield provided by the business judgment rule). 
 33. See Keith R. Fisher, Nibbling on the Chancellor’s Toesies: A “Roguish” Concurrence with 
Professor Baxter, L534 ALI-ABA 397, 410–18 (1993); Baxter, supra note 28, at 15–31. There are a 
handful of scholars who claim that bank directors owe a fiduciary duty to depositors. See, e.g., Richard 
M. Cieri et al., The Fiduciary Duties of Directors of Financially Troubled Companies, 3 J. BANKR. L. 
& PRAC. 405, 407 (1994) (“[D]irectors of banking institutions owe fiduciary duties to the bank’s 
depositors . . . .”) (citing Irving Bank Corp. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 845 F.2d 
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Second, most banks are owned by a bank holding company (BHC), 
which is typically structured as a corporation. BHCs own about eighty 
percent of all banks34 and control virtually all bank assets in the United 
States.35 It is therefore accurate to state that most banks (and almost all 
bank activities) are controlled by holding companies governed by 
corporate boards, to which corporate law applies. 
Third, banking regulation has increasingly become preoccupied with 
“shadow banking,” which is loosely defined as the functional economic 
activity of banking taking place outside of the regulated depository 
institutions that we think of as banks. Shadow banking largely occurs in 
non-bank capital market firms, such as investment banks or hedge funds.36 
Thus, shadow banks are subject to corporate (or partnership) governance, 
not bank governance. 
In the aggregate, then, while it is important to acknowledge 
differences exist between bank governance and corporate governance, 
these differences are largely insignificant for purposes of this Article. 
Bank governance and corporate governance share many of the same key 
features that create conflicts between shareholders and creditors, including 
limited liability for shareholders and similar fiduciary duties owed to 
shareholders. And to a large degree, bank governance has given way to 
corporate governance due to the outsized importance of BHCs and shadow 
banking. Banks are effectively governed under the same or similar laws as 
corporations, and banking scholars have long conceded the issue of 
                                                     
1035, 1039 (D.C. Cir. 1988)); Harvey R. Miller, Corporate Governance in Chapter 11: The Fiduciary 
Relationship Between Directors and Stockholders of Solvent and Insolvent Corporations, 23 SETON 
HALL L. REV. 1467, 1478 (1993) (“[D]irectors of banking institutions owe fiduciary duties to 
depositors . . . .”) (citing Irving Bank Corp., 845 F.2d); Stephen Bainbridge, The Fiduciary Duties of 
Bank Directors, PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM (Mar. 21, 2013), http://www.professorbainbridge.com/ 
professorbainbridgecom/2013/03/the-fiduciary-duties-of-bank-directors.html [https://perma.cc/ 
67LN-3SJX] (“There is some precedent for the proposition that ‘it is well settled that the fiduciary 
duty of a bank officer or director is owed to the depositors and shareholders of the bank.’”) (quoting 
Lane v. Chowning, 610 F.2d 1885, 1888–89 (8th Cir. 1979)). As I describe in greater detail in a 
forthcoming article, this claim is based on arguments made by the Office of Thrift Supervision and 
other regulators in the early 1990s, which were themselves based on exaggerated or incorrect readings 
of a handful of cases. This claim also ignores the overwhelming amount of case law that explicitly 
contradicts this claim of a duty to depositors. See, e.g., 7 BUSINESS AND COMMERCIAL LITIGATION IN 
FEDERAL COURTS § 81:41 (3d ed.) (stating that “most courts have found that a bank does not owe a 
fiduciary duty to its depositors in the absence of special circumstances . . . [t]he relationship between 
a bank and a depositor is a contractual, rather than a fiduciary one”) (citing a lengthy list of 
representative cases in support of this claim). 
 34. See Percent of Banks Owned by BHCs, FED. RES. (Dec. 2012) https://www.fedpartnership. 
gov/-/media/bank-life-cycle/charts/bank-ownership-by-bhcs.pdf?la=en [https://perma.cc/FWR5-
JBF6]. 
 35. See Dafna Avraham, Patricia Selvaggi & James Vickery, A Structural View of U.S. Bank 
Holding Companies, 18 FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y. ECON. POL’Y REV. 65, 66–67 (2012). 
 36. See Min, Market Discipline, supra note 1, at 1444–45. 
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governance to corporate law scholars. As I describe in the next several 
sections, corporate governance is not well suited for the unique problems 
posed by banks and other leveraged financial intermediaries. 
B. Shareholder Primacy in Corporate Governance 
For nearly a century, the primary focus of the corporate governance 
literature has been the agency cost problems that arise out of the corporate 
form and its separation of ownership and control.37 Such scholarship 
predominantly focuses on the agency conflicts between shareholders and 
managers, due in large part to the ubiquity and dominance of the 
shareholder primacy norm.38 But it has long been recognized that other 
agency conflicts, besides those between shareholders and managers, 
abound in the corporation. Michael Jensen and William Meckling 
famously argued in 1976 that the modern corporation was best understood 
as a “nexus of contracts” that served to minimize transaction costs between 
the corporation’s different constituents, such as its investors, managers, 
directors, employees, and suppliers.39 This “contractarian” account of the 
corporation has become the dominant theoretical framework used to 
explain and justify corporate law and its emphasis on shareholder interests. 
But as Jensen and Meckling themselves articulated, embedded in each of 
the different contractual (or quasi-contractual) relationships in the 
corporate “nexus of contracts” is an agency relationship, which gives rise 
to potential agency conflicts.40 This is true not only for shareholders, but 
also for other corporate constituents. 
                                                     
 37. See ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND 
PRIVATE PROPERTY 113–16 (10th prtg. 2009) (1932); Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 
ECONOMICA 386, 403–05 (1937); Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: 
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 310 (1976); see 
also Jill E. Fisch, Measuring Efficiency in Corporate Law: The Role of Shareholder Primacy, 31 J. 
CORP. L. 637, 663 (2006) (stating that “[c]orporate law devotes its primary focus to the agency 
problems created by conflicts of interest—conflicts between shareholders and managers, between 
controlling and minority shareholders, and between shareholders and other stakeholders”) (citing 
REINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND 
FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 2 (2004)). 
 38. Many scholars use the term “shareholder primacy” to refer to the norm or practice or legal 
requirement of prioritizing shareholder wealth maximization over other business interests. See, e.g., 
Jill E. Fisch, Measuring Efficiency in Corporate Law: The Role of Shareholder Primacy, 31 J. CORP. 
L. 637, 643 (2006). Stephen Bainbridge contrasts this “shareholder wealth maximization norm” with 
a broader definition of shareholder primacy, one in which shareholders are not merely the corporate 
stakeholders whose interests are prioritized, but also the parties that “exercise ultimate control of the 
corporate enterprise.” Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate 
Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 563 (2003). The terms “shareholder primacy” and “shareholder 
wealth maximization norm” are used interchangeably in this Article. 
 39. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, 
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 305–10 (1976). 
 40. Id. at 310. 
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In order to justify shareholder primacy then, a normative argument 
must be made as to why shareholder interests should be prioritized over 
the interests of other stakeholders. Given that nonshareholders, such as 
employees and creditors, contribute valuable inputs to the corporation and 
face potentially steep agency costs arising out of their contractual 
relationships with the corporation, just as shareholders do, why should 
shareholder agency conflicts—and these alone—be given weight in 
corporate governance? 
Two main justifications for shareholder primacy are typically given 
under the contractarian account. First, the residual claimant status of 
shareholders means that their interests are aligned with those of other 
stakeholders. Because shareholders are paid last and only after other 
stakeholders with fixed claims (such as suppliers, employees, or creditors) 
are paid in full, they possess the appropriate incentives to maximize firm 
value.41 Second, it is argued that nonshareholders, who hold fixed claims 
on the assets of the corporation, are in a better position to protect their 
interests through contract. Because nonshareholders have fixed claims, 
which are discrete and limited, they can more easily write complete 
contracts to address any potential agency problems they may face, utilizing 
negative control provisions to limit potentially adverse behavior on the 
part of managers. Conversely, because shareholders hold residual and 
open-ended claims, any contract they might contemplate would invariably 
be incomplete, since shareholders essentially depend upon optimal  
wealth-maximizing behavior on the part of managers, which is difficult or 
impossible to dictate through contractual terms.42 
C. The Conflict Between Shareholder Primacy and Bank Governance 
While the normative arguments for shareholder primacy may be 
convincing in the case of corporate governance—and there are many who 
do not agree43—these arguments are far less compelling in the case of 
banks and other leveraged financial intermediaries for several reasons. 
1. Creditor–Shareholder Agency Conflicts in Banking 
To state the obvious, shareholder incentives are distinct from, and 
often opposed to, those of creditors. In general, shareholders prefer greater 
risk, because they have limited downside (the value of their initial 
investment) and unlimited upside, as the residual claimants. As Nobel 
                                                     
 41. See Min, supra note 22, at 127–28. 
 42. Id. at 129–31. 
 43. See, e.g., Blair & Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, supra note 21, at 249; 
Charles W.L. Hill & Thomas M. Jones, Stakeholder-Agency Theory, 29 J. MGMT. STUD. 131, 132 
(1992). 
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Prize winning economist Robert Merton illustrates, equity value is 
increased when firms invest in assets with higher volatility, even as this 
creates greater default risk—and thus lower expected value—for 
creditors.44 
The schism between shareholder and creditor interests is particularly 
sharp in banks due to the high degree of leverage involved. Because banks 
rely disproportionately on debt to fund their business activities, the 
rewards associated with higher risk are potentially much greater for bank 
shareholders than they are for shareholders in other types of business 
corporations, as the potential rewards associated with risk-taking are 
greatly increased. To illustrate this proposition, let us imagine a 
nonfinancial business (Corporation 1) worth $200 million, funded 50-50 
with equity and debt (pari passu, with a 5% promised interest rate), that is 
considering between two projects: Project A is a low-risk, low-return 
investment that costs $200 million and has a 100% probability of returning 
$220 million one year from today; Project B is a high-risk, high-return 
investment that costs $200 million, has a 50% chance of returning $300 
million one year from today, and has a 50% chance of becoming 
completely worthless. 
Here, Project B is much worse for creditors. Creditors who opt for 
Project B would suffer an expected loss of $47.5 million (-47.5%)45 as 
compared to an expected return of $5 million with Project A.46 Project B 
is also a bad deal for shareholders, who would suffer a net expected loss 
of $2.5 million,47 as compared to an expected gain of $15 million from 
                                                     
 44. See Robert C. Merton, On the Pricing of Corporate Debt: The Risk Structure of Interest 
Rates, 29 J. FIN. 449, 455–62 (1974). But see Robert R. Bliss, Market Discipline: Players, Processes 
and Purposes, in MARKET DISCIPLINE ACROSS COUNTRIES AND INDUSTRIES 37, 43–44 (Claudio 
Borio et al. eds., 2004) (arguing that Merton’s conclusion was flawed insofar as it failed to adequately 
consider the reduced value of future dividends and increased cost of funding that accompanies higher 
default risk). 
 45. There is a 50% chance that the creditors in this scenario would earn back their principal plus 
the promised 5% coupon (a total of $105 million) and a 50% chance that they would lose all of their 
promised principal and interest ($0). Thus, the creditors would expect to get back $52.5 million from 
Project B, which is $47.5 million less than the original $100 million they lent to Corporation 1. 
 46. There is a 100% chance that the creditors in this scenario would earn back their principal 
plus the promised 5% coupon, for a total of $105 million, which is $5 million greater than the $100 
million they lent to Corporation 1. 
 47. There is a 50% chance that the shareholders in this scenario would have a stake worth $195 
million ($300 million less the $105 million promised to the creditors) and a 50% chance that their 
investments would be worthless ($0). Thus, the expected equity value of Project B would be $97.5 
million, which is $2.5 million less than the $100 million the shareholders invested in Corporation 1. 
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Project A.48 Finally, Project B has a net expected loss of $50 million,49 
which is far worse than the net expected gain of $20 million associated 
with Project A. 
Corporation 1 Example 
 Project A Project B 
Net expected 
value 
$220m - $200m = 
$20m 
((50% * $0) + (50% * $300m)) 
- $200m = - $50m 
Net expected 
creditor value 
$105m - $100m (initial 
investment) = $5m 
((50% * $0) + (50% * $105m)) 
- $100m = - $47.5m 
Net expected 
SH value 
$220m - $105m 
(payment to creditors) - 
$100m (initial 
investment) = $15m 
((50% * $0) + (50% * ($300m - 
$105m (payment to creditors)) 
- $100m (initial investment) =  
- $2.5m 
 
Now consider a $200 million financial company (Corporation 2) with 
leverage typical for a bank, funded 10% with equity ($20 million), and 
90% with debt (pari passu, with a 5% interest rate) ($180 million) that is 
considering the same two projects described above. Again, Project B is 
much worse for creditors, with an expected loss of $85.5 million  
(-47.5%),50 as compared to an expected return of $9 million from Project 
A.51 But in this scenario, because of the high leverage, Project B would 
provide shareholders with an expected return of $35.5 million,52 which is 
far better than the $11 million return they would receive from Project A.53 
Thus, while Project B is worse for creditors and for the corporation as a 
whole, it is preferable for shareholders. 
 
                                                     
 48. There is a 100% chance in this scenario that the shareholders would have a stake worth $115 
million ($220 million less the $105 million promised to the creditors), which is $15 million greater 
than the $100 million they initially invested in Corporation 1. 
 49. There is a 50% chance that the company will be worth $300 million after one year and a 50% 
chance that the company will be worth $0. Thus, the expected value of the company would be $150 
million, which is $50 million less than the $200 million invested into it. 
 50. There is a 50% chance that the creditors here would receive their promised principal plus 
interest (a total of $189 million) and a 50% chance they would receive nothing ($0). Thus, the creditors 
would expect to receive $94.5 million from Project B, which is $85.5 million less than the $180 million 
they lent to Corporation 2. 
 51. There is a 100% chance that the creditors here will receive $189 million, which is $9 million 
more than the $180 million they lent to Corporation 2. 
 52. There is a 50% chance that the shareholders here would have a stake worth $111 million 
($300 million less the $189 million promised to the creditors) and a 50% chance that their stakes would 
be worthless ($0). Thus, the expected equity value of Project B is $55.5 million, which is $35.5 million 
more than the $20 million they invested in Corporation 2. 
 53. There is a 100% chance in this scenario that the shareholders would end up with a stake 
worth $31 million (a total firm value of $220 million less the $189 million owed to the creditors), 
which is $11 million greater than the $20 million they initially invested in Corporation 2. 
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Corporation 2 Example 




$220m - $200m = $20m ((50% * $0) + (50% * $300m)) - 




$189m - $180m (initial 
investment) = $9m 
((50% * $0) + (50% * $189m)) - 
$180m = - $85.5m 
Expected SH 
value 
$220m - $189m 
(payment to creditors) - 
$20m (initial 
investment) = $11m 
((50% * $0) + (50% * ($300m - 
$189m (payment to creditors)) - 
$20m (initial investment) =  
- $35.5m 
 
As the above examples show, the high leverage that is endemic to 
banks can steer shareholder incentives toward greater risk, even though 
this risk may run counter to the interests of creditors and society as a 
whole. 
In addition to having a greater proclivity toward risk, bank 
shareholders also have strong incentives to delay or prevent the initiation 
of resolution54 proceedings or mergers when the bank is insolvent (or near 
insolvency).55 Because their equity value in insolvency is worth nothing, 
they have every incentive to want to keep the firm open and gamble on big 
bets that can restore the firm back to a state of positive value. The tension 
between bank shareholders and creditors is exacerbated by the fact that 
most investors in bank debt place an especially high premium on the 
safety, liquidity, and “moneyness” of their investments.56 Because bank 
creditors tend to be more risk averse and place a greater value on 
protecting their principal than do other types of investors, any losses they 
                                                     
 54. Ordinarily, insolvent companies are resolved in bankruptcy proceedings. But in the United 
States, federally insured depository institutions are resolved by the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation, which is granted with special resolution privileges, including almost unilateral control 
over the failed bank’s assets and limited judicial review. See Richard M. Hynes & Steven D. Walt, 
Why Banks Are Not Allowed in Bankruptcy, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 985, 998–1000 (2010). 
 55. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Double Liability of Bank Shareholders: History 
and Implications, 27 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 31, 53 (1992). 
 56. See, e.g., Gary Gorton & George Pennachi, Financial Intermediaries and Liquidity Creation, 
45 J. FIN. 49 (1990); Morgan Ricks, Regulating Money Creation After the Crisis, 1 HARV. BUS. L. 
REV. 75, 76, 79–80 (2011); Jeremy C. Stein, Monetary Policy as Financial Stability Regulation, 127 
Q.J. ECON. 57, 59–60 (2012); Adi Sunderam, Money Creation and the Shadow Banking System, 28 
REV. FIN. STUD. 939, (2015); Gary Gorton, The Development of Opacity in U.S. Banking 10–13 (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 19540, 2013); Gary B. Gorton & Andrew Metrick, 
Securitized Banking and the Run on Repo 10–12 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 
15223, 2009). 
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may suffer are actually comparatively costlier than the above illustration 
indicates, since they are paying a premium for safety and liquidity.57 
Of course, the interests of bank shareholders are not completely at 
odds with those of bank creditors. Shareholders want to increase the value 
of their equity stakes, and higher equity value means a larger buffer against 
losses to the creditors (assuming that returns on equity are retained and not 
returned to shareholders through capital distributions). Bank regulators 
have long emphasized earnings as an important barometer of bank 
stability. But the above hypotheticals demonstrate two points. First, 
shareholders tend to prefer projects with greater risk–reward tradeoffs than 
do creditors. Second, shareholders of highly leveraged corporations (such 
as banks and other financial institutions) prefer greater risk than do 
shareholders of less leveraged corporations (i.e., nonfinancial businesses). 
It logically follows, then, that to the extent that shareholders control 
the corporation (or alternatively, that corporate managers emphasize 
shareholder interests), this presents a large agency cost problem for bank 
creditors, one which has been exacerbated by the strong emphasis on 
shareholder primacy that has taken over corporate boardrooms in recent 
decades. As Bratton and Wachter note, the stock markets strongly 
rewarded those financial firms that took on greater levels of risk  
2003–2007.58 This shareholder pressure caused bank managers to fall into 
line by taking on higher risk and higher growth strategies, including the 
origination of riskier loans, more investment in risky securitized assets, 
and the use of higher leverage.59 These decisions to take on greater risk 
were, of course, to the detriment of creditor interests. In short, the high 
degree of leverage sharply increases the conflict between creditors and 
shareholders and undermines the argument for shareholder primacy in 
bank governance. 
2. Government Guarantees in Banking Create  
Taxpayer–Shareholder Conflicts 
Were the problem of bank governance merely a conflict between 
shareholder interests and creditor interests, it might be tempting to leave 
this issue for private ordering to resolve. But, because the federal 
government guarantees most of the debt obligations used to fund bank 
investment activities, as I describe below, the creditor–shareholder 
                                                     
 57. Relative risk appetite is not the only issue upon which shareholders and creditors disagree. 
Capital distributions, such as dividends, are also an important area of conflict between bank 
shareholders and creditors, as a body of research has explored. See, e.g., Laetitia Lepetit et al., Bank 
Dividends, Agency Costs and Shareholder and Creditor Rights (Apr. 28, 2016) (unpublished paper). 
 58. William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder Empowerment, 
158 U. PA. L. REV. 653, 719–21 (2010). 
 59. Id. at 720–21. 
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conflicts described in the previous section are transformed into  
taxpayer–shareholder conflicts, as taxpayers are the parties who ultimately 
suffer if shareholder preferences are actuated into greater bank risk-taking. 
Bank deposits make up the vast majority of bank balance sheets, and 
these are explicitly insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation.60 Additionally, most observers believe that many other bank 
obligations enjoy implicit guarantees of varying degrees against loss. Debt 
and mortgage-backed securities issued by the government-sponsored 
enterprises Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are understood to benefit from 
very strong implicit government guarantees against credit losses.61 Other 
debt instruments that are important to banking, such as senior debt 
obligations of systemically important financial institutions or uninsured 
bank deposits, also are thought to benefit from implicit government 
guarantees.62 
The government backing of banking liabilities is important for two 
reasons for the purposes of this paper. First, because bank creditors are 
relieved of their downside risk, they lack the incentives to try to monitor 
and reduce bank risk-taking. In the aftermath of the crisis, there may be 
some reason to question whether bank creditors are effective at 
disciplining banks, even in the absence of any government guarantees, due 
to the fact that they are investing in money instruments specifically 
intended and designed to be insensitive to risk.63 But, it is undisputed that 
when government guarantees come into play, any such creditor discipline 
dissipates. Thus, to the extent that advocates of the status quo in corporate 
governance rely on the assumption that self-interested creditors will 
                                                     
 60. As the Federal Reserve’s Flow of Funds report indicates, insured bank deposits make up 
roughly two-thirds of all outstanding bank liabilities. See FED. RESERVE, FLOW OF FUNDS ACCOUNTS 
OF THE UNITED STATES, tbl. L.111 (U.S. Chartered Depository Institutions) (2016) https://www. 
federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/current/z1.pdf. 
 61. See David Min, How Government Guarantees Promote Housing Finance Stability, 50 HARV. 
J. ON LEGIS. 437, 457 (2013) [hereinafter Min, Housing Finance Stability]. 
 62. See, e.g., GARY H. STERN & RON J. FELDMAN, TOO BIG TO FAIL: THE HAZARDS OF BANK 
BAILOUTS 1 (2004) (stating that the term “too big to fail” describes “the receipt of discretionary 
government support by a bank’s uninsured creditors who are not automatically entitled to government 
support”); João A. C. Santos, Evidence from the Bond Market on Banks’ “Too-Big-to-Fail” Subsidy, 
20 FED. RES. BANK N.Y. ECON. POL’Y REV. 29, 29–31 (2014) (reviewing the literature on  
too-big-to-fail implicit guarantees and summarizing the author’s findings that the largest banks enjoy 
a subsidy of roughly 41 basis points by virtue of these implicit guarantees); Sebastian Schich & Sofia 
Lindh, Implicit Guarantees for Bank Debt: Where Do We Stand?, 2012 OECD J. 1, 2–4 (2012) 
(describing the implicit guarantees that accrue to “too big to fail” institutions, and the policy 
implications of these guarantees). 
 63. As I have described, creditors did not react to rising bank risk in the period immediately 
preceding the 2007–2008 financial crisis. This lack of reaction may be because banks are in the 
business of creating monetary instruments, which are necessarily designed to be risk-insensitive so 
that they can maintain their par value over time. See generally Min, Market Discipline, supra note 1. 
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monitor and enforce their own interests against greater risk-taking, it is 
clear that this assumption is ill-founded when it comes to banks. 
Second, because these guarantees effectively place the costs of bank 
risk onto taxpayers, they transform a private ordering conflict into a public 
policy concern. It is taxpayers, not creditors, who may lose out due to the 
corporate governance structures in place for banks. Thus, bank governance 
presents a unique policy problem. The shareholder interests that are 
generally prioritized in corporate governance are potentially in conflict 
with the interests of taxpayers, who assume the losses of bank creditors by 
virtue of the federal government’s role as deposit insurer and provider of 
implicit guarantees on senior debt. 
3. Steep Negative Externalities in Banking 
Why not simply unwind the government’s role as deposit insurer? 
Why does the federal government guarantee bank creditors? The answer 
to this question presents another wrinkle in thinking about bank 
governance. Government guarantees are generally understood to exist for 
bank debt obligations because these obligations are highly vulnerable to 
the problem of runs and panics, which can create enormous social and 
economic costs not borne by bank investors (“negative externalities” in 
economic parlance).64 Banking panics occur when a large number of bank 
runs65 happen simultaneously, causing short-term liquidity to disappear 
and banks to forcefully liquidate their assets in a fire-sale environment. 
Banks are uniquely vulnerable to runs and panics because of several 
features specific to banking. First, banks are in the business of making 
idiosyncratic investments (loans), thus creating a steep informational 
mismatch between banks and their outside investors.66 Second, banks, by 
their very nature, are highly leveraged, utilizing a large amount of debt 
(and very little equity) to finance their investment activities.67 Finally, 
banks have a steep maturity mismatch between their assets (which are 
                                                     
 64.  The term “negative externality” refers to a cost or loss created by an actor that is not borne 
(“internalized”) by the actor. The concept (if not the term itself) was famously articulated by Ronald 
Coase in The Problem of Social Cost, as he focused on the problem of “those actions of business firms 
which have harmful effects on others.” R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 1 
(1960).   
 65. Bank runs are generally defined as a situation in which short-term creditors rush to redeem 
their invested funds (such as by withdrawing their demand deposits or by refusing to roll over short-
term debt obligations), thus forcing the bank to sell illiquid assets to meet these redemptions. See Min,  
Housing Finance Stability, supra note 61, at 475–77 (citing Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, 
Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity, 91 J. POL. ECON. 401, 401 (1983)). 
 66. Min, Market Discipline, supra note 1, at 1428–29 (citing Ben Bernanke & Mark Gertler, 
Banking in General Equilibrium 1–2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 1647, 
1985)). 
 67. Id. at 1429. 
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long-dated) and their liabilities (which are very short-dated, often 
redeemable on demand).68 
Collectively, these features render banks highly susceptible to the 
problem of bank runs (and thus bank panics). As I have previously 
described: 
The high level of debt means that a relatively small credit loss can 
render a bank insolvent. At the same time, the informational 
asymmetries inherent in banking mean that [short term creditors] do 
not know whether a particular sign of bank problems . . . is an 
indication that the bank is insolvent. Finally, the maturity mismatch 
of bank assets and liabilities means a bank does not have sufficient 
liquid assets to pay off more than a very small fraction of its liabilities 
at any given time. If a large number of depositors simultaneously seek 
to withdraw their funds from the same bank, that bank must find new 
sources of liquidity, and this may entail selling off its loans in a “fire 
sale” environment.69 
It is because of this confluence of factors that bank balance sheets 
are described as “fragile.” Moreover, as Patricia McCoy has stated, “The 
unstable balance sheet of banks is not a quirk. Rather, it is inherent to a 
key economic function of banks, which is providing financial liquidity.”70 
In other words, banking is thought to provide a fundamentally important 
and necessary public good—financial liquidity and credit 
intermediation—which is unfortunately accompanied by a small but 
potentially catastrophic risk of banking panics. 
Were panics simply problems confined to the banking system, a large 
government role in the banking system might be unnecessary. But banking 
panics have typically led to major economic downturns, with major 
reductions in household wealth, the availability of credit, and economic 
growth.71 On average, in the three years following financial crises, 
government debt increases an average of 86% due primarily to the sharp 
decline in tax receipts caused by economic stagnation.72 Why exactly 
banking panics lead to such large negative economic consequences is a 
matter of some debate, but it is mostly undisputed that panics do lead to 
these high costs.73 
                                                     
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Patricia A. McCoy, The Moral Hazard Implications of Deposit Insurance: Theory and 
Practice 4 (Feb. 18, 2007) (unpublished manuscript prepared for presentation at Seminar on Current 
Developments in Monetary and Financial Law), https://works.bepress.com/patricia_mccoy1/18/. 
 71. See generally REINHART & ROGOFF, supra note 2. 
 72. REINHART & ROGOFF, supra note 2, at 142, 164. 
 73. Reinhart & Rogoff argue that financial crises are “an amplification mechanism” that severely 
exacerbate existing monetary shocks by reducing the stock of available credit. REINHART & ROGOFF, 
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To the extent that these massive economic costs are not borne by 
bank investors, the public policy priority of limiting bank risk gains even 
more importance, both practically and theoretically. Bank shareholders 
and creditors alike bear only a fraction of the potential costs of a bank 
failure (and resulting crisis).74 Combined with the taxpayer’s assumption 
of most banks’ credit risk, described in the previous section, the large 
negative externalities associated with bank failures create a very sharp 
conflict between the interests of shareholders, who have a much higher 
preference for risk and the interests of public policy, which, for a multitude 
of reasons, seeks to maximize financial stability and minimize bank risk. 
II. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS TO BANK GOVERNANCE PROBLEMS 
Having laid out the case that there are outsized conflicts between 
public policy and bank shareholder interests, the next question to address 
is how we should address these conflicts. As described previously, 
external restrictions on risk-taking, such as capital or liquidity 
requirements, are most heavily relied upon to limit bank risk-taking.75 But 
these types of external regulations are inherently adversarial and require 
regulators to play a cat and mouse game with the regulated financial 
institutions.76 As the 2007–2008 financial crisis showed us, this type of 
approach may fail, with catastrophic consequences. Thus, it is worth 
thinking through how we might better align the governance of financial 
institutions with the public policy goals that animate our external 
regulation of these firms. 
There have been a number of different substantive proposals offered 
to try to address bank governance issues. Many, like the incremental bank 
                                                     
supra note 2, at 145. Bernanke has hypothesized that this amplification mechanism exacerbates 
problems in the real economy by sparking a reduction in household consumption. Ben S. Bernanke, 
Chairman, Fed. Reserve Bd., The Financial Accelerator and the Credit Channel, Remarks at the Credit 
Channel of Monetary Policy in the Twenty-First Century Conference, Fed. Reserve Bank of Atlanta 
(June 15, 2007), https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20070615a.html 
[https://perma.cc/J88Z-Z3RA]. Along the same lines as Bernanke, others have asserted that the 
massive economic downturns following banking crises are due to a “vicious circle” or “paradox of 
thrift” effect, in which deleveraging causes a reduction in asset values, which leads to greater 
consumption declines, which then beget further deleveraging. See, e.g., Paul Krugman, The Paradox 
of Thrift—for Real, The Conscience of a Liberal, N.Y. TIMES: KRUGMAN (July 7, 2009, 8:48 AM), 
http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/07/07/the-paradox-of-thrift-for-real/?_r=0; Irving Fisher, 
The Debt-Deflation Theory of the Great Depression, 1 ECONOMETRICA 337, 337 (1933). 
 74. See supra notes 65–73 and accompanying text. 
 75. See supra notes 3–15 and accompanying text. 
 76. See Stanley Fischer, Vice Chair, Fed. Reserve Bd., The Importance of the Nonbank Financial 
Sector, Speech at the Debt and Financial Stability—Regulatory Challenges Conference (Mar. 27, 
2015), https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/fischer20150327a.htm (stating that 
prudential regulation is a “cat and mouse game”). 
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governance reforms advanced in Dodd-Frank,77 have sought to more 
closely align the incentives of bank managers with the interests of bank 
shareholders.78 As described above in Part I.C, this shareholder-centric 
approach to governance reform may be inappropriate for banks and other 
leveraged financial institutions. But there has been a small but growing 
number of scholars who have recognized the conflict between existing 
governance norms and public policy aims when it comes to banks and have 
proposed reforms to help ameliorate these conflicts. I describe several of 
the leading proposals below, including one offered by Professor Steven 
Schwarcz to create a “public governance” duty for bank directors. While I 
think Professor Schwarcz’s idea is more promising than the other 
approaches offered to date, there are some potential issues with it, 
including that the public governance duty may be too vague to be 
practicable and that it faces significant hurdles to implementation. 
A. Realigning the Incentives of Bank Managers 
One avenue towards narrowing the conflict between shareholders 
and public policy objectives is simply to bypass shareholder control and 
create greater incentives for bank managers to act in the best interests of 
creditors, regulators, or both. This can either be done through a stick or 
carrot approach. Proposals in the first category have largely involved 
imposing personal liability on bank executives in the event of bank losses. 
Dodd-Frank § 954 provides one example of this type of approach, 
requiring corporations to develop and implement “claw backs” that take 
back a certain amount of incentive-based compensation from bank 
executives in the event of an accounting restatement.79 In a similar vein, 
Claire Hill and Richard Painter have called for imposing personal liability 
on highly paid bank executives, up to a certain set amount (say all but $2 
million of the banker’s assets), in the event of the bank’s insolvency.80 
Alternatively, there are some proposals that seek to alter the 
compensation structure of bank executives’ pay in ways that better align 
their incentives with those of creditors, the public, or both. Some have 
called for deferring a portion of bank executives’ compensation, to be paid 
                                                     
 77. See supra notes 6–13 and accompanying text. 
 78. See, e.g., SIR DAVID WALKER, A REVIEW OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN UK BANKS AND 
OTHER FINANCIAL INDUSTRY ENTITIES—FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS 68–89 (2009) (recommending 
steps to facilitate greater engagement by shareholders); Lucian Bebchuk, Letting Shareholders Set the 
Rules, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1784, 1784 (2006) (calling for relaxations on limitations on shareholder 
power). A subset of these proposals seeking to more closely align bank managerial interests with 
shareholder interests view the problem as one of short-termism, and have consequently sought to 
maximize long-term shareholder value. 
 79. Dodd-Frank, supra note 6, § 954. 
 80. HILL & PAINTER, supra note 18, at 149–51. 
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out after some set period (say five years later) if the bank has not received 
a government bailout or declared bankruptcy.81 Others have called for 
including a significant debt component in bankers’ compensation 
packages.82 The reasoning behind these proposals is similar to the 
reasoning behind the punitive measures offered under Dodd-Frank § 954’s 
claw-back measures and Hill and Painter’s personal liability—to 
incentivize bank executives to seek less risk. 
This general approach of targeting the incentive structures of bank 
managers is promising but insufficient and, I think, unlikely to be 
successful. While these proposals, either individually or in the aggregate, 
may influence managerial behavior to some degree by affecting personal 
incentives, the problem is that bank executives, and the directors who 
oversee them, still owe fiduciary duties to shareholders. Bank executives 
and directors can be fired or removed for failing to maximize shareholder 
wealth, and they may be subject to shareholder lawsuits as well.83 Thus, 
even if bank executive compensation is structured to emphasize the 
interests of financial stability, it is important to recognize that bank 
executives face powerful countervailing financial incentives. 
B. Increased Liability for Bank Shareholders 
Several scholars have argued for changing the incentives of bank 
shareholders, rather than bank managers. One recent such proposal has 
been offered by Richard Ridyard, who channels earlier pre-crisis papers 
written by Jonathan Macey and Geoffrey Miller,84 as well as Richard 
                                                     
 81. KENNETH R. FRENCH ET AL., THE SQUAM LAKE REPORT: FIXING THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM 
50–51 (2010). 
 82. See Bebchuk & Spamann, supra note 18, at 253 (calling for bank executive pay to be tied to 
a set percentage of the aggregate value of common shares, preferred shares, and bonds issued by the 
bank or bank holding company); Frederick Tung, Pay for Banker Performance: Structuring Executive 
Compensation for Risk Regulation, 15 NW. U. L. REV. 1205, 1207 (2011) (suggesting that bank 
executives be compensated in part with subordinated debt securities); Wulf A. Kaal, Contingent 
Capital in Executive Compensation, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1821, 1850–72 (2012). 
 83. As I discuss supra in Part I.A, the governance of financial institutions is somewhat more 
complicated than the governance of corporations, insofar as bank governance and corporate 
governance are slightly distinct. But bank directors still owe fiduciary duties to shareholders. See 
Macey & O’Hara, supra note 27, at 99 (noting that bank directors owe a duty of care to shareholders). 
See also OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, THE ROLE OF A NATIONAL BANK 
DIRECTOR: THE DIRECTOR’S BOOK 78 (Washington, DC, 2010) (describing how bank directors owe 
a “duty of loyalty” which requires that they “exercise their powers in the interest of the organization 
and its stockholders” rather than in their own personal interest). Moreover, officers and directors of 
bank holding companies or non-bank financial companies, like other corporate officers and directors, 
owe the traditional corporate fiduciary duty to shareholders. See AMERICAN LAW INST., PRINCIPLES 
OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.01(a) (1994) (stating that 
corporations must be managed “with a view to enhancing corporate profit and shareholder gain”). 
 84. Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Double Liability of Bank Shareholders: History 
and Implications, 27 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 31 (1992). 
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Grossman,85 who argue for reinstating some form of the double par 
liability that was once ubiquitous in U.S. banking prior to the 1930s.86 
These proposals aim to better align the interests of shareholders, who 
are seen as the drivers of bank governance and its preference for excessive 
risktaking, with those of policy makers. But while these solutions are 
intriguing, I tend to think they suffer from two related concerns about 
implementation and practicability. First, it is unclear how and to what 
extent shareholders would be liable. Ridyard’s double par liability 
proposal acknowledges that the double liability imposed upon banks in the 
U.S. in the pre-1930s era was based on the par value of the stock, which 
constituted effectively all of the value of the stock, because there was 
limited or no secondary market trading of this bank stock.87 Of course, 
bank equity today is widely traded in secondary markets, and such trading 
is encouraged by regulators, as it helps to ensure that there is sufficient 
equity capital for banks. But, this secondary market trading means that 
double liability based on par value is largely meaningless, and there are 
equitable and distributional questions around how double liability might 
be levied against shareholders who purchased their shares in the secondary 
market.88 Perhaps more importantly, these types of proposals may cause 
secondary market trading in bank equity shares to tumble, particularly 
during periods of financial or economic distress. This in turn would 
invariably impact the valuation of bank shares, creating a potential  
trade-off between imposing shareholder liability and reducing bank 
capital. 
                                                     
 85. Richard S. Grossman, Double Liability and Bank Risk Taking, 33 J. MONEY, CREDIT & 
BANKING 143 (2001). 
 86. Richard Ridyard, Toward a Bank Shareholder-Orientated Model: Using Double Liability to 
Mitigate Excessive Risk-Taking, 2 UCL J.L. & JURIS. 141, 141 (2013). Peter Conti-Brown offers a 
more aggressive and more expansive version of this approach, proposing unlimited shareholder 
liability for certain banks. Peter Conti-Brown, Elective Shareholder Liability, 64 STAN. L. REV. 409, 
428–41 (2011). 
 87. See generally Ridyard, supra note 86. 
 88. For example, one way to calculate double liability might be on the average market value of 
the shares over some discrete time period, such as during the last calendar year. However, this could 
raise fairness issues. For example, imagine that the average market value was $30.00. Shareholder A 
had purchased her shares at their low point, say for $10.00 a share, and Shareholder B had purchased 
his shares at their high point, say for $40.00 a share. Both Shareholder A and Shareholder B could 
raise fairness concerns. A paid only $10/share for these, so why should she now be liable for an 
additional $30 per share? At the same time, B paid $40/share, so he has already absorbed a heftier loss 
than other shareholders and is now being asked to pay up an additional $30/share on top of that. In 
addition to these equitable concerns, it seems likely that increasing liability to shareholders beyond 
what they paid may have severe deleterious effects on the liquidity of bank shares, particularly during 
periods of financial or economic turmoil, which may exacerbate the procyclicality of bank credit 
cycles. 
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C. Public Governance Duty 
What has been largely absent from the nascent conversation over 
how to best resolve the governance issues in banking is any mention of 
changes to the fiduciary duties owed by bank directors and officers. 
Professor Steven Schwarcz recently authored an excellent and intriguing 
paper arguing for a change in fiduciary duties owed by bank directors, one 
which would create an additional “public governance” duty that would 
apply to directors at systemically important financial institutions.89 One 
advantage of targeting director duties is that it creates flexibility to adopt 
various changes to improve bank governance. If it was determined that 
claw backs and changes to managerial liability were the most effective 
means of fulfilling these fiduciary duties, then directors could adopt these 
measures. But if these measures proved less than effective, directors could 
adopt many other measures to try to fulfill this fiduciary duty. At the same 
time, applying a public governance duty to directors would have the 
advantage of directly aligning the incentives of directors with public 
policy priorities. 
But while I think this general strategy of targeting director duties has 
significant promise, I believe there are still some potential roadblocks to 
Professor Schwarcz’s specific proposal. First, Professor Schwarcz would 
limit his proposed public governance duty to SIFIs.90 But the conflicts 
inherent to bank governance are not limited to SIFIs, nor are the steep 
negative externalities associated with banking panics confined to SIFIs. 
Thus, this proposal seems too narrow in the classes of institutions it 
targets. 
Second, the public governance duty may be too vaguely defined. 
What does a public governance duty entail? Professor Schwarcz describes 
it as “a duty not to engage in excessive risk-taking that could systemically 
harm the public”91—essentially, a duty of safety and soundness. But it is 
unclear what this duty would entail, how it would differ from the existing 
statutory duty to refrain from unsafe or unsound conduct, and how it might 
be balanced against the traditional duty that officers and directors owe to 
shareholders. Nor does it respond to the critique, made by Bainbridge and 
others, that imposing a dual fiduciary duty effectively nullifies any 
fiduciary duty and provides management with a broader shield against 
misconduct, as they can pursue their own interests and play each 
constituency off of one another.92 
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 92. Stephen M. Bainbridge, In Defense of the Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm: A Reply 
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Third, and I think most importantly, it is unclear how this duty would 
be effectively enforced. Professor Schwarcz avoids spelling out many of 
the details, as he describes his proposal as “primarily normative,” 
emphasizing the question of “whether the duty should be imposed, not 
how it might be imposed.”93 But the mechanisms by which such a duty 
would be imposed matter, because this gets to the question of what type of 
pressure would be levied upon bank directors. One problem with a  
general public governance duty is that it has no natural  
self-interested constituency—other than perhaps the FDIC and other bank  
regulators—invested in ensuring compliance. Thus, this duty, even if 
formulated as a fiduciary duty, would, in practice, potentially be redundant 
of existing bank regulatory powers, because it relies on federal regulators 
for its enforcement. 
CONCLUSION 
As I hope I have illustrated in this symposium Article, it is clear that 
internal governance reforms can help bolster the prudential regulatory 
aims of public policy makers. There have been a number of promising 
proposals made to help align bank governance incentives with those of 
prudential regulators, but these do not appear sufficient. I aim to develop 
these themes and my proposed solutions for the potential conflicts between 
bank governance and systemic risk regulation in future work. 
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